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Abstract. Since the seminal work by Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, Toulmin, 
Ong, Giuliani and many others in late fifties and sixties, dialogue and 
argumentation have increasingly been at the center of philosophical discussions. 
Modelization of arguments and “argumentation schemes” constitute one of the 
main domains within the AI & Law field. The construction of Legal Electronic 
Institutions (LEI), and Ontomedia, an Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) 
platform in the context of the research carried out within the Catalan White 
Book on Mediation, has enhanced the discussion about fundamental issues on 
the theoretical approach taken in building such Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 tools. In 
this paper, I will address the question of how the content of ancient stasis, 
ekphrasis and inventio may be captured and reelaborated to define their 
theoretical backbones. I will call “relational justice” the conceptual legal 
framework in which Semantic Web strategies can be nested to offer a better 
user-centered service.   
Paraules clau: argumentation, dialogue, dialectic, rhetoric, Semantic Web, 
ODR, Electronic Legal Institutions, stasis, inventio, relational justice 
1    Introduction 
During the last year, the Institute of Law and Technology (IDT-UAB) and many other 
research Institutes and Universities in Catalonia are currently developing the Catalan 
White Book on Mediation.1 Those are the preliminary works to draft a general statute 
introducing and defining mediation as a complementary dispute resolution tool for 
courts, local and regional administrations (municipalities and regional councils, e.g.), 
and social and economic institutions (such as hospitals, schools, consumer agencies or 
chambers of commerce).  
    This is a sustained effort covering many fields of law —divorce and family 
problems, adult and juvenile crimes, labor conflicts, consumer complaints, 
commercial disputes, etc. Technology is certainly an issue. It is one of the areas being 
explored to set up online tools to facilitate business, citizens, customers and 
consumers to solve, or at least better manage, their disputes before suing and going to 
the courts. 
    A twofold strategy is being followed. First, in the spirit of the CONSOLIDER 
Project Agreement Technologies2 and the COST initiative ICO801,3 an automated 
protocol and negotiation prototype is under construction by Pablo Noriega and Carlos 
López using electronic institutions technologies [1]. Second, Ontomedia, a general 
platform for mediation services, is being developed within two adjacent national 
projects as well. Several objectives have been already reached. The state of the art of 
ODR services has been established and updated [2, 3],4 and a preliminary middle-out 
mediation core-ontology is ready to be populated and worked out [7]. 
    In this paper, I will reflect on the general purposes and theoretical background of 
these approaches to foster an interdisciplinary dialogue, and to open up the discussion 
to a broader audience. The paper is structured as follows. I will introduce, first, Legal 
Electronic Institutions (LEI) and Ontomedia.  Section 3 and 4 will reflect on their 
theoretical grounds, linking both strategies with the revival of the ancient traditions of 
dialectics, rhetoric and logic. Finally, in section 5, I will introduce the idea of 
relational justice to make sense of the technology and philosophical grounds 
described in the previous sections. 
2 LEI strategy and theoretical approach 
It may be quickly noticed that, in fact, there is not a unique generic platform under 
construction, but two. In what it follows, the two strategies and theoretical approaches 
will be briefly described. 
                                                          
1 See http://llibreblancmediacio.com  
2 http://www.agreement-technologies.org/  
3 http://www.agreement-technologies.eu/  
4 “None of the service providers reviewed seems to have truly sophisticated ODR technologies 
like the ones reported in academic fora.” [1]. See the previous technical reports by  Stranieri, 
Yearwood and Zeleznikow [4], Tyler and Bretherton [5], and Thiessen and Zeleznikow [6]. 
2.1   ODR as Legal Electronic Institution  
The prototype proposed by Noriega and López [1] is based on the notion of electronic 
institution (EI) and assembled through the EIDE tools developed in the IIIA.5 It 
corresponds to an attempt to automate as much as possible the ongoing interaction 
flow between two sides within conflict scenarios. In this situation, a multiagent 
system (MAS) may perform several interactive moves towards an eventual 
agreement. The whole process is plotted in Fig. 1, assuming a standard of non-
intrusive mediation, arbitration and some forms of negotiation, not necessarily 
mediated. 
    I will follow briefly now the authors’ own description. For a more complete and 
detailed explanation, the reader is invited to go directly to [1]. 
    Electronic Institutions (EI) assume that all interactions are among autonomous 
agents, and that all interactions among agents are speech acts (that count as actions in 
the world). Noriega and López mention three main EI components: (i) the dialogical 
framework (specifying the content and interpretation of the admissible speech acts); 
(ii) the performative structure (indicating how the interactions are organized within 
the institution); (iii) the rules of behavior that put constraints on the actions 
(illocutions) that individuals who are playing a given role may take at some point in 
the enactment. When an EI is entitled to perform legal acts, or at the end of successive 
steps may produce a result with legal value, or an agreement that can be alleged in 
Court or before other appropriate ruling institutions, we face an Legal Electronic 
Institution (LEI). LEIs pose some interesting problems to the current legal theory that 
can be treated separately. I will not go deeper here. 
    The authors show the complete performative structure of a mediation institution in 
Fig. 2, where the first box and the last one correspond to scenes and dark boxes 
correspond to mediation activities: (i) a scene where the claimant chooses the type of 
negotiation she wants to use, (ii) four different negotiation conventions, (iii) a scene 
for standard non-intrusive mediation, (iv) and two ensuing scenes for arbitration and 
recommendation. 
 
                                                          
5  http://e-institutions.iiia.csic.es    
  
 
    Fig. 1. Prototype structure. Source: [1] 
 
     
    The two starting and ending boxes start and terminate enactments. Lines 
connecting boxes (and widgets) indicate transitions, labeled with the roles that may 
move from one scene to another. In this particular institution three roles have been 
modeled: parties (the two sides of a mediation process), staff (taking care of 
institutional functions like time-keeping or record handling) and mediator.  
    It may be noticed that this performative structure allows different institutional ways 
of ODR (negotiation, mediation, arbitration) following iterative cycles. However, it is 
not necessary to complete one full cycle (e.g. negotiation). It may be possible to go 
directly to the arbitration process, if this is the case.  
    The important point is that in each separate box may be nested an autonomous 
argumentative process between the parties. This process may contain procedural rules 
which can be (at least partially) operated trough automated reasoning inferences. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Performative structure of a Legal Electronic Institution. Source: [1] 
 
2.2   The Ontomedia strategy 
Let’s go to the second model, now. Ontomedia follows a different strategy, a user-
centered approach which takes into account a more restricted definition of negotiation 
and mediation as ODR institutional devices, following the spirit of the EU Directive 
52/2008.6 It is not intended, at least primarily, to cover conciliation or arbitration 
issues. They are not excluded of the underlying model, but what is intended to build 
up is a multi-layered and indirect strategy to assist either lay or professional people in 
                                                          
6 Art. 3.a. “‘Mediation’ means a structured process, however named or referred to,  hereby 
two or more parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, on a voluntary basis, to reach an 
agreement on the settlement of their dispute with the assistance of a mediator” ; art. 3.b. 
‘Mediator’ means any third person who is asked to conduct a mediation in an effective, 
impartial and competent way, regardless of the denomination or profession of that third person 
in the Member State concerned and of the way in which the third person has been appointed or 
requested to conduct the mediation.” It is worth to mention R. (9): “This Directive should not is 
in any way prevent the use of modern communication technologies in the mediation process.” 
their dispute resolution processes. This is a platform to be used by citizens, 
administrations, institutions and professional mediators as well.  
In a nutshell, Ontomedia will allow users and professionals to meet in a community-
driven Web portal where contents are provided by users and annotated by the ODR 
Web Platform [7, 8]. Its usability is tailored on the domains previously identified 
within the Catalan White Book: commercial and business disputes, consumer 
complaints, labor conflicts, family, restorative justice (adult and juvenile mediation in 
criminal issues), community problems, local administration, health care, 
environmental management, and education. 
It is worth noticing that to the extent that these are broad domains, the platform is 
conceived as generic. However, the means used to solve or manage a conflict are 
close up to the nature of the conflict. In a quarrel among teenagers in a high school, 
race, culture, family and class may constitute separate issues. The dispute components 
may be different from those in a contract-breaching problem between providers and 
consumers. A collective quarrel about the placement of a new mosque—not an 
infrequent social problem in Spanish towns—usually requires different interventions 
and several negotiation techniques in addition to mediation. To the extent that such 
conflicts may need a set of different negotiation tools, the use of an online platform 
requires different functionalities linked to a previous definition of the available tools. 
This is usually called a “bus of services” or “service bus” [7, 8, 9]. 
Citizens (both professionals and users of mediation services) may use any kind of 
device to access the portal (computers, mobiles), and in any format suitable for their 
purposes (text, speech, video, pictures). We are confident that this flexibility will 
allow users to participate in mediation services as in a face-to-face basis, but with the 
advantages of distributed and even remote access. 
Some ontologies are being constructed to annotate all kind of contents and also to 
help analyze multimedia content (see Fig. 3). The multimedia analysis is devoted to 
enhancing the information a mediator possess during a mediation session, capturing 
mood changes of the parties and any other psychological information that can be 
useful for mediators, just as if they were in a room with the users of the mediation 
service. All types of metadata can be automatically extracted and stored to be further 
used within the mediation process (provided the previous authorization by users). 
Ontomedia will also develop tools to encourage users to exploit the advantages of 
sharing information and experiences with others. In this way, users have the 
possibility to tag and store content that are useful or interesting to them, and to find 
similar cases. In doing so, they can create social communities of people with common 
interests. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3  Layered Diagram of Ontomedia Mediation Platform. Source: [8] [9] 
 
2.3   Inner and outer strategies between Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 
Conceptual models underlying strategies for the mediation LEI and Ontomedia are 
not incompatible, and they may be envisaged into the broader framework of the 
second generation of Semantic Web developments.   
    Both may comply with the features pointed out by Motta and Sabou [10, 11]: (i) 
reuse (vs. semantic data generation); (ii) multi-ontology systems (vs. single-ontology 
systems); (iii) openness with respect top semantic resources, (iv) scale as important as 
data quality, (v) openness with respect to Web (non-semantic resources), (vi) 
compliance with the Web 2.0 paradigm, (vi) openness to services. 
    LEI may incorporate the necessary flexibility to be interoperable and nested into a 
structure such Ontomedia. Easy and friendly access to justice can be offered through 
the so-called “Web of data”.7  The usage of RDF Schema (RDFS) and the Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) allow the inference of relationships between data in 
different applications or in different parts of the same application.  Objects, and not 
                                                          
7 “RDF Schema (RDFS) and the Web Ontology Language (OWL) provide the ability to infer 
relationships between data in different applications or in different parts of the same 
application. These Semantic Web languages allow for the assertion of relationships between 
data elements, which developers can use, via custom code or an emerging toolset, to enhance 
the URI-based direct merging of data into a single RDF store” [12] 
 
 
only websites, can be directly linked among them. Diagram of Fig. 4 shows a simple 
way to draw the encroachment between both LEI and Ontomedia. I have developed 
elsewhere what it does mean for future developments of law [13]. I have lean on 
recent work from James Hendler to analyze the link between the two approaches (Fig. 
3). The first one remains highly theoretical, on top of the intertwined Webs 2.0 and 
3.0, but able to be nested within the Ontomedia environment. The second, on the 
contrary, offers a park of legal services on mediation.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4  James Hendler’s diagram (with permission). Source: [12], modified by P.C. 
 
3  Discussion: Dialogue, Dialectic and Rhetoric 
I will split up the discussion of the legal philosophical groundings of these models 
in two different parts. For the sake of clarity, in this section I will consider the general 
foundation for dialogue, and the revival of dialectic and rhetoric in argumentation and 
philosophy of law. Section 4 will face the pragmatic developments of such a revival.  
It would be naïve to link the whole conception to a single philosophical source. 
LEI models follow previous theoretical approaches made by Douglas North (on 
institutions) [14], Cristiano Castelfranchi (on rationality, and normative and 
interactive behavior—trust, deception…) [15], and John R. Searle (on speech acts and 
social institutions) [16]. Collective properties emerging out of the process, and the 
accurate conceptual representation of the whole process (e.g. turn taking, decision 
making, iterative cycles, and final move forward…) are taken into account.  
It seems to me that the disputation model figured out by Noriega and Lopez fits 
nicely into the main flow of contemporary argumentation theory and formal dialectic 
systems. However, it should be immediately noticed that the main structure of the 
proposal is not necessarily related to automated reasoning, but rather to the way of 
conceiving the architecture of the system of dialogue interactions. 
1.1. Dialogue Systems 
Dialogue systems built up in the AI & Law domain use to be symmetrical, iterative, 
cyclic and procedurally-driven [17]. Legal procedural rules have received a privileged 
attention [18], and their main requirements are defining the parties, describing their 
positions, and setting a controlled step-by-step process to manage the disputes. The 
ODR model recently presented by J. Zeleznikow, A. Lodder and E. Bellucci   [19, 20, 
21] is following this well-trodden path too. It combines game-theory, case-based 
reasoning and the Harvard model for dispute resolution (BATNA) to offering advice 
in divorce situations. 
    The main dialogue structure assumed by all these developments comes from the 
ancient dialectic and has been described several times by D. Walton [22, 23] as the 
“fundamental building blocks” of any dialectical system: (i) the two participants, 
called the proponent and the respondent, (ii) the types of moves (taking the form of 
various speech acts) that the two participants are allowed to make, as each takes his or 
her turn to speak, (iii) the sequence of moves, in which the appropriateness of each 
move depends on the type of preceding move made by the other party, (iv) the goal of 
the dialogue as a whole. 
    Walton identifies four kinds of moves in such systems: (i) the asking of questions, 
(ii) the making of assertions, (iii) the retracting of assertions, and (iv) the putting 
forward of arguments.  
    Similarly, dialogue types may be classified according to their main objectives as 
follows: (i) persuasion, (ii) inquiry, (iii) negotiation, (iv) information-seeking, (v) 
deliberation, (vi) eristic. These types of dialogue would proportionate the main 
scenarios in which different dialogues may take place.  
    From a legal point of view, stemming from a goal-oriented approach, Sartor has 
expanded this taxonomy adding three more types of dialogue: (i) epistemic inquiry, 
(ii) practical inquiry, (iii) and reconciliation [24]. 
   This means that such a structured valued framework —more specifically, a 
teleological notion of law as a cognitive technology being organized through a valid 
normative system— may determine the structure of dialectic interactions.  
    Sartor’s position is far from simple. The thesis is “that legal reasoning has a 
collective (interactive) dimension, in regard to which diverse dialectical patterns may 
be required, according to the goals to be achieved and the context in which they are to 
be pursued” [24]. 
    I would say that this collective, interactive dimension, especially if it is produced 
through the Internet, is a regulatory one. There is a regulatory order that emerges out 
from the interactions. However, not all regulatory patterns are “law” or “legal” in the 
normative sense. Law components, as we know them so far —i.e., rules (norms), 
statutes, judicial decisions, rulings, and legal rights and duties— have to be combined 
with social emergent patterns of behavior and social rights and duties to operate 
through the Web. Governance, soft-law, reputation systems and, especially, trust, are 
not mandatory elements. Dialectic systems and argumentative models have to 
represent conceptually this kind of hybrid, mixed, mashed-up scenarios as well if they 
are going to be used or taken into account.       
1.2. Dialectic, Rhetoric and Logic 
This is linked to another line of arguments. But I should warn the reader at this point 
that I will follow a historical thread. Only at the end I will come back to the mediation 
models. The main scope of this historical turn is setting a broader interpretative legal 
context on dialogue and law in which our proposals may acquire an added sense to be 
properly understood and evaluated.   
    It seems to me that Walton and Sartor’s taxonomies, and the procedural way in 
which they face the modeling of dialogues, are deeply rooted in a conception of 
reason that stems from the classic (and complex) relationships between logic, 
dialectic and rhetoric. It has been observed many times that ancient dialectic and 
rhetoric have a strong legal flavor. Dialectic mirrors legal dialogical controversies, 
and ancient rhetoric, as it may be found e.g. in the works by Cicero and Quintilian, 
mirrors speeches in judicial settings [25, 26].  
    Leff [27] sketches four points of contrast between the two disciplines: (i) dialectic 
deals with general, abstract issues, rhetoric with specific, circumstantial issues; (ii) 
dialectic considers the link of propositions and follows logical rules of rationality, 
rhetoric considers the relationship between propositions and situations and follows 
rules (or norms) that refer to appropriate social relationships; (iii) dialectic proceeds 
through question and answer (and the interlocutors seek to persuade each other), 
rhetoric proceeds through a flow of uninterrupted discourse, and the speakers seek to 
persuade the audience; (iv) dialectic employs a technical language, rhetoric uses plain 
natural language for persuasive purposes. 
     This is a schematic, but still useful summary to realize the complexity of the issue. 
Regarding logic, Aristotle and the ancient tradition tried to maintain separated 
reasoning related to truth, dialogical reasoning regarding opinions and beliefs, and the 
places or topoi regarding the ways in which these beliefs are conveyed and shared 
(that is to say, rhetoric). The medieval tradition played endlessly with those 
distinctions, until the coming of Humanism in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. 
Conflicts, disputes, controversies, were placed at the center of this ars discendi et 
disserendi [28]. 
    It is generally accepted by historians of philosophy that the humanist tradition of 
German, Dutch, English and Italian Universities [29, 30, 31] worked out the Greek 
and Latin texts and mixed up the medieval syllogistic logic (e.g. from Petrus 
Hispanus) to elaborate an educational discourse, more adapted to everyday life, to 
social and economic new problems, and to the structures of political power of the 
recently born European states. Even the Catholic and Imperial Spain, crashed under 
the Inquisition, received their impact [32, 33]. 
    Dialogue emerged at the beginning as a new framework to contain the classical 
topoi; and, in this way, logic became a part of dialectic. That is to say, inner discourse 
with the soul could convey truth (and not only beliefs), and outer discourse could 
reflect the moves of what was intended as “thought” (and not only language). 
Rhetorical speech (verba) was the way to concrete this thought in different dramatic, 
legal or political scenarios [28].  
    There is a string line going from the works by Agricola, Melanchton and Sturm, to 
Talon and Ramus [34, 35]. This common thread was cut up with the violent defeat of 
Ramism and the Jansenist Logic of Port Royal under the Ancient Régime. But it was 
weaved by protestant countries and transferred into the common law [36, 37].   
     Interestingly enough, the subject/object philosophical approach was reversed in 
this long history, as the judicial object was.8 Paradoxically, it was the influence of 
Ramism into judicial procedures what excluded the discussion of facts out from 
dialogue and left them entirely to the decision of an authoritative judge. As W. Ong 
[39], C. Perelman [40] and A. Giuliani [37], among others, explain, a judicial 
asymmetric order would substitute to the isonomic order of ancient dialectic.9  
     It would be worth noticing here that almost all the discourses on the revival of 
ancient dialectic and rhetoric in the second half of the 20th c. escape the response to 
the question of what happened in between with the topics of legal dialectic and 
rhetoric during the 18th and 19th centuries. This is surprising, because we have detailed 
accounts on humanistic and rationalistic thought. It seems that dialogue had just 
disappeared from legal and political theory. 
    Still, this is not an easy issue. However, at least regarding to legal reasoning, the 
answer could lie on the prevailing of syllogistic judicial reasoning after the Code de 
Napoleon (1804), and the coming of the German Historical School, Pandectas and the 
conceptualist schools of law.  The answer points then to the establishment of a new 
political and administrative form of government called Rechtstaat, État de Droit, 
Estado de Derecho, Rule of Law, in which the old topoi were subjected to the 
procedural ring of constitutions and systems of legal norms. However, as Tocqueville 
early noticed [L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, 1856], all the legal administrative 
apparatus (including the judiciary) of the legal state built up in the Ancient Régime 
would remain along the Enlightenment and the 19th century.  
 
1.3. The legal methods 
I will pursue elsewhere this historical explanation [41].  The point I would like to 
stress here is that, with independence of the guaranties, constraints and requirements 
of the judicial decision, the modern state, and not society, community or individual 
interactions, built up the main framework for the setting, procedures, roles and 
development of legal arguments. Under those conditions, arguments, topoi, places and 
reasoning were bound to be put under a legal interpretation theory (the legal content 
of Sätze, Instituta, Normen or rules addressed to an authoritative judge). “Legal 
                                                          
8 Pozzo [32] has shown convincingly how the pair of Greek concepts ‘subject’ (hupokemeinon) 
and ‘object’ (antikemeinon) actually mean the opposite of their post-Cartesian usages. The 
former refers to what we call today a formal approach (the logical mind), and the latter to the 
investigative activity of senses (the subjective conditions of experience). 
9 « Puisque la preuve judiciaire n’est pas différente de la preuve scientifique. Il faut que 
controverse et dialogue soient exclus du procès ; la ‘questio facti’ —considérée comme 
autonome par rapport à la ‘questio iuris’— est confiée tout court à l’arbitrium iudicis » [37]. 
method” or the “science of law” were the umbrella under which this interpretative 
turn took place.  
    In this way, from Savigny, Puchta, Jhering and Gerber (19th c.), to Gény, Jellinek, 
Kelsen and Hart (20th c.), dialogue was definitively excluded from law and legal 
theory, and left to the more “insecure” domain of political arena or private economic 
markets. Decisions were placed under a set of norms which would constitute the 
choice for a judicial syllogism, based on the burden of proof and the consistency of a 
non-contradictory argumentation as warrants or pre-requisites for the judicial 
induction —assigning probable truth values to inferences sorted out from premises 
containing insufficient information. 
     Along with fallacies, these constitute precisely the points chosen by Walton to 
reelaborate the problem of innovation and creation of new arguments [23, 42]. This 
goes directly to the core of one of more pervasive and persistent problems of 
cognitive sciences and philosophy. How the potential creativity of the mind can be 
described and explained? Are there rules or patterns to be followed for innovation? 
Or, as the ancient philosophy would put it, how can be filled up the gap between 
rhetoric and logic? 
4 Discussion: Pragmatics, mediation, and innovation 
Argumentation schemas may be defined as “forms of arguments representing 
premise-conclusion and inference structures of common types of arguments” [43].  
For Walton’s “new dialectic” the old topoi, loci or places constitute “defeasible 
argumentation schemas” to be combined and aligned to produce a full chain of 
reasoning. Argument schemas are presumptive and open to revision and change. 
     As we will see, these inferences are conceived to be “rationally binding” between 
the participants engaged in any dialogue [42]. This approach fits particularly well in a 
judicial perspective, in which either the judge or the lawyer have to find new and 
convincing arguments to sustain proof. According to Walton’s proposal, the gap 
between logic and rhetoric may be filled up leaning gradually on the identification, 
analysis, and evaluation processes (dialectic), and on the innovative one (rhetoric). 
Heuristics are used to find new arguments, but the crucial point is called dialectic 
relevance, a method of chaining both forward and backward to get the chain of 
argumentation to match up in the middle [23, 42]. The whole process is recursive and 
iterative, going from (i) acceptable premises to (ii) rules of inference, and (iii) a 
chaining recursive device. Diagrams may be plotted for visualization.10  
4.1.  Dialectic Systems and Pragmatics 
Dialectic relevance is not the only way proposed to connect truth and persuasion. 
There is another tradition to be taken into account. Models by Sartor, Walton and 
Lodder lean heavily on logic (dialectic). On the contrary, the second set of models 
stems from pragmatics and focus on communication. 
                                                          
10 http://araucaria.computing.dundee.ac.uk  
Pragma-dialectics is an approach to argumentation which tries to combine both 
perspectives, but leaning on the use of language for resolving disputes [44]. Walton’s 
pragmatic perspective on conversation tries to deepen into it to reconstruct the 
propositional content of the hidden or tacit arguments of both sides: their 
“argumentative reasoning patterns” [43]. On the contrary, the Pragma-dialectics 
school (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, Jacobs…) lean on the techniques of 
practical persuasion. They define dialectics as “a method of regimented opposition” in 
verbal communication and interaction “that amounts to the pragmatic application of 
logic, a collaborative method of putting logic into use so as to move from conjecture 
and opinion to more secure belief” [44].  Therefore, they are much more interested in 
the effects of communication than in its truth. They consider three different aspects of 
“strategic manoeuvring”: (i) the topical potential associated with a particular 
discussion stage, (ii) the audience demands in this stage, (iii) the presentational 
demands appropriate for the moves made in that stage. 
It is worthwhile to mention here that we owe to the works carried out by Jackson 
[45], Jacobs [46], and Aakhus [47, 48, 49] some detailed accounts of mediation 
experiences and practices. The new wave of Pragma-dialectics faces the “pragmatic 
reconstruction” of arguments11, the “collaborative design of the disagreement space”, 
and the types of rationality that mediators employ in interpreting conflict situations 
(critical discussion, bargaining, and therapy). “We do not take the central problem of 
pragmatics to be how communicators assign functional meaning to specific messages 
or disambiguate speaker intention, but how is that people mutually negotiate social 
activity with language and thus participate in everyday life” [50]. 
 
 
4.2.  Inventio and judicium 
 
Both ways to tackle innovative arguments have their roots in dialectics and rhetorics. 
However, it seems to me that this second perspective takes more into account the shift 
of Humanist tradition we mentioned before, and more specifically, the discursive side 
of Agricola’s notion of dialectic.  
Rudolf Agricola (1444-1485) set a phenomenology of language and speech which 
originated a revolution in the way old rhetorical texts were interpreted [51]. We may 
find in his major contribution, De Inventione Dialectica Libri Tres (1479) at least five 
new starting points that lead to an abductive notion of interaction and reasoning: (i) 
human interaction as a negotiated and complex shared dialogical object (ii) thought as 
a product of discourse (speech), (iii) cognitive and emotional empathy as the basis for 
a common human (inner and outer) understanding, (iv) context as a shared sequence 
of already known scenarios which help the selection of features given to a term to 
produce meaning, (v) discovering as a collective process to build a systematic path 
through dialectic from the known to the unknown. 
We usually find in the literature on Agricola that his notion of place and his 
taxonomy of topics would allow him to reason in a new pedagogical way, but through 
                                                          
11 “The hallmark of pragmatic reconstruction lies in the way a form of argumentative dialogue 
is tailored  to circumstances of the dispute in order to achieve a particular type of outcomes” 
[47]. 
the syllogistic “middle term” that would relate his logical perspective to the Middle 
Age and not to the formal developments of Descartes and Leibniz.12 Agricola extends 
the scope of dialectic to include all kind of (reasoned) discourses, and the places of 
dialectic to the level of concepts. Doing so, his philosophy attends less to the truth and 
validity of arguments than to their effects.   
This is right. But we may interpret it as “psychologism” or, from a cognitive 
science perspective, as closer to contemporary notions such as “schema”, “script”, 
“folk model”, “category” and “difference”. 
As it is well known, the art of rhetoric was divided in five parties: inventio,  
dispositio, elocutio, memoria and declamatio. During the Renaissance, Inventio was 
situated as the first part of dialectics, while its second part, judicium, was supposed to 
temper, modulate and guide in a syllogistic manner the subject matter discovered or 
created in the first one [51].13  
Agricola argues for an extension of places or ‘seats of arguments’ related to the 
nature of language “by whose instruction as if by signs of some sort [velut signis 
quibusdam], we surround the mind with the things themselves and thereby perceive 
what is in each thing both probable and suitable to the purpose of our discourse” [Inv. 
I, 1], “A place therefore is nothing else but a certain common characteristic of a thing 
[communis quedam rei nota], by observing which all that is probable about a given 
thing can be discovered. Let then a place be so defined by us.” [Inv. I, 2] [52, 53, 54].     
 
 
4.3.  Stasis and ekphrasis 
Stasis (status) is the proper manner of discovering the question to be answered in 
every situation. Ekphrasis (descriptio) is the ability to elicit suitable contents on any 
subject from any of the places: the description of one term relatively to another to 
discover agreement and difference.  
    Status, in the classical rhetoric of Hermogenes, Cicero, and Quintilian, intended to 
define the different stages of a judicial plea between accusation and defense. It was 
translated into the common law tradition as issue (e.g. by Thomas Wilson and 
Blackstone), although this legal term does not express exactly the original meaning 
[55].  First, the status was supposed to give the litigants an understanding of their 
dispute through a categorization of the conflicting statements. But it indicated too the 
                                                          
12 See e.g. [39], following Bochenski. 
13 “The instrument of ‘inventio’ was one of the main tools of classical rhetoric, and paired with 
judicium, it was the first and most important of the five parts of classical rhetoric. It was the 
art of finding and searching suitable ideas, reasons and arguments for a specific purpose, by 
using the search formulas ‘topoi’ or ‘loci’. These ‘arguments’ were intended to approach the 
truth as closely as possible, and were often classified according to the dominant means of 
persuasion: by employing reason or logic (logos), arousing emotion (pathos), or 
demonstrating trustworthy character (ethos). But the instrument of inventio  did not so much 
intend to lead the user to new metaphysical insights; is purpose was of a more practical 
nature, it was designed to produce an object or work: a poem, a speech, an emblem or 
proverb, etc…” [51, esp. chap. 2] 
disposition to reason and to debate what the conflict was about.14 There is a 
procedural dynamic within the status.  
    We should emphasize here the visual or pictorial side of the arguments as 
conceived dialectically: ekphrasis is the graphic or discursive description in visual 
terms of stasis [56]. People, literally, may see in one single shot the object of dispute 
and the content of the arguments used to describe their positions and to eventually 
solve the issue at dispute. 
    To Agricola, language, but also the interactive capacity of the mind to recognize 
and understand other minds, are extraordinary important to depict this narrative object 
and to convey emotions: “To me an emotion seems to be nothing else but a certain 
impulse of the mind by which we are driven to desire or avoid something more 
intensely than we would in a calm state of mind. Every emotion, therefore, arises 
from interest in objects of desire or avoidance. We desire whatever things are in fact 
or in appearance good, and we avoid those which are, or are felt might be, harmful. 
Nor are we moved only by those things which we think are good or bad for ourselves; 
we also grieve, rejoice, become angry or sad because of the situation of another.”  
(emphasis added) [De Inv. III.1] [52] 
5 Relational justice: dialogue, abduction and reasoning 
There are several ways to understand the old tradition of dialectic and rhetoric from 
contemporary theory of argumentation. Logical, rhetorical and dialogical approaches 
are usually considered as theoretically different [57]. Stasis and ekphrasis may be 
considered from the dynamics of the strictly judicial point of view [26], in which the 
issue at stake is identified with the object of dispute, or from a broader perspective, in 
which stasis is produced through an abductive process of reasoning among the 
different parties [55].  Similarly, it seems to me that the old notion of ekphrasis may 
be (partially) captured by the notion of visual abduction [58].    
 
5.1. Mediation as a transformative process 
Context, environment and possible argumentation scenarios constitute a big issue. 
There is a common trend towards normativity in the contemporary argumentation 
theorists: (i) implicit contexts considered as norms within the language and discourse 
[59, 60], (ii) implicit contexts linked to types of dialogues that guide the functioning 
of dialectical relevance [22, 23], (iii) implicit contexts linked to the notion of practical 
reasoning and intention [24], (iv) implicit contexts linked to the environment of 
Multi-Agent Systems, where actions of electronic agents shape a social and 
institutional behavior [15] (v) implicit contexts linked to a pragmatic normative 
                                                          
14 “The suggestion that the status or issue had to be espied, that it was not given, that questions 
required work, that, for issue to be joined, much debating was sometimes necessary is 
characteristic of the common law pleading tradition.” [55]  
version of dialectic, in which “dispute mediators, in the course of their work, perform 
normative construction like a critical analyst” [49].  
    Perhaps the legal perspective of the old rhetoric still weights in the way norms are 
conceived. However, with mediation processes in mind, the construction of the 
“inner” and “outer” environments through dialogue—in Herbert Simon’s sense [61]—
is not a predetermined task. In a mediation process, in real conflicts, contexts may 
shift within types of dialogues, and they cannot be easily categorized as belonging to 
a single type. Imagination, or “moral imagination”, as Paul Lederach puts it, is an 
essential feature of mediators [62]. Listen to this narration from a professional 
mediator: 
 
Two guys take a car after having a drink. The guy who was driving was not the owner 
of the vehicle. The car went up in fire and the driver could get out and save his life. The 
other guy died. The mediation process takes place two years later between the mother of 
the dead guy and the surviving driver. He asks for mediation. The mediator (a woman) 
ought to understand de conflict first, and she prepared the individual session with the 
mother. The key questions were: How do you feel? Because I believe that you blame 
yourself, while everyone knows that you are not guilty at all; who are you angrier with 
over the death of your son? She cried for more than 30 minutes, and so did the mediator. 
They embraced each other. They went for a coffee. In a week there was no more need for 
mediation. She could rebuild again her relationship with him without being helped, and 
she could accept as well the therapy that she had been rejecting so far.15     
 
    Some of the taxonomies built up to capture these transformative features reflect 
this creative character, especially in hard cases of restorative justice [63]. Victim-
offender mediation styles may be also combined to form typologies of dialogue, 
depending upon the ordered preferences of the different styles: (i) therapeutic 
(mediator-conducted), (ii) empowerment (victims’ healing, offenders’ assumption of 
responsibility), (iii) or narrative (management of the memories and expression of 
feelings) (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 5 Victim-sensitive Offender Mediation Typology. Source: Adapted from [64]. 
Umbreit, Bradshaw and Coates were reporting on crimes with severe violence. 
                                                          
15 I thank Maria Munné (mediator), for writing down this personal communication.  
5.2. Ontomedia and LEI 
Let’s go back now to the models underlying Legal Electronic Institutions and 
Ontomedia. After the examination of some of their philosophical foundations, our 
conclusion is similar to Leff’s assertion: “In sum, neither the rhetoric of effective 
persuasion nor the logic of rational persuasion should adopt theoretically purified 
goals.” [27] 
 Fig. 6 shows how LEI and Ontomedia strategies may be related. The rational side 
of dialogue an its discursive, expressive or emotional side are understood not as 
separate sets of discrete entities but rather as a continuum covering intertwined 
processes and outcomes. The link between inventio and judicium, or between the 
propositional content of assertions and creative innovative moves, can be assumed 
following the same continuum line.         
 
 
          
       Fig. 6  Dialectic and rhetorical links related to LEI and ONTOMEDIA. 
     
 This continuum is not meant to equate eclectically different theoretical trends. 
Differences can and should be maintained. Contemporary argumentation theories 
closer to the dialectic approach tend to assume speech act theory, felicity conditions 
and rules of inference, combined with some heuristics. Non-monotonic logic is 
usually applied leaning on Toulmin’s shoulder. Pragma-dialectics, on the contrary, 
lies more on the heuristic side of rhetoric and explicitly rejects speech act theories 
based on non-situated or unbound conditions [50]. Still, Ducrot’s notion of 
argumentation dans la langue leads to a semantic notion of pragmatics in which every 
utterance has an enunciative and argumentative value [60]. 
 However, LEI and Ontomedia may adopt different notions of pragmatics and 
different pragmatic approaches as well that may be combined and operated according 
to the chosen functionalities. 
 Ontomedia adopts a user-centered approach, in which the professional mediator 
may chose among a box of tools to perform her work. LEI tends to guide the user 
through a process that automates the procedural parts of mediation through successive 
stages.      
5.3. Web 3.0 and relational justice scenarios 
Justice, reason and argumentation have been linked to power since the beginning.  It 
would be naïve, then, trying to understand the functions, intentions and meaning of 
Greek and Latin literature on the subject without any understanding of the underlying 
principles of ancient societies. To put only one example, the Aristotelian notion of 
“distributive justice” is better understood through some notion of the market (or 
“proto-market”) in which distributive problems arose and the concept was coined 
[65]. Recent empirically-based studies on organizations state clearly that “justice and 
power are intertwined: one cannot really understand justice dynamics without 
understanding power dynamics and vice versa, because the concern for justice acts 
check on the use of power” [66]. 
    As I showed before, conflict and argumentation as we know them today are linked 
to the emergence of the modern state. Legal reasoning has been historically shaped as 
well through concepts, procedures and structures related to a kind of judiciary often 
tensioned by the king and parliamentary powers. Not surprisingly, rhetoric and reason 
in the 16th and 17th centuries are linked to the emergence and counterbalance of raison 
d’état [67, 68].  
    Therefore, Ontomedia and LEI cannot be conceived in a vacuum, but having into 
account that new scenarios of conflict resolution and management are arising in the 
broad technological environment of the Internet. It is my contention that the 
implementation and use of technology changes the nature of law, in any way we may 
conceive it. Through the Internet environments, law cannot be defined solely as 
related to the national state or even to the institutions of the Rule of Law, but to all the 
regulatory devices at stake, including languages, protocols, electronic agents and 
reputation systems.   
    Therefore, disputes, controversies, and conflicts may be better represented and 
nested as scenarios of relational justice. In computing, a scenario is a representation 
of the types of interactions end-users will maintain with the system, the way in which 
the system faces the interface with them in their daily activity. In the case of 
Ontomedia, the different domains from the White Book on Mediation (health, 
education, family, consumers’ complaints, and so on) are being used as scenarios. 
What these scenarios have in common is that they have been chosen and constructed 
in social fields where some experiences on mediation and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) have already arisen.  
     This means that these are fields in which some conflicts (social, political or 
economic) have originated some kind of social bottom-up resilience to fix the 
problem. In some cases as well, increasingly, administrations have reacted to give the 
opportunity to citizens to maintain a more effective interaction with them. In both 
cases, some forms of Online Dispute Resolution can be (or have been already) 
adopted. Therefore, we have chosen a middle-out strategy as ontological 
methodology, and we have situated our intervention under the label of relational 
justice. 
    I broadly define relational justice as the justice through the Internet, that is to say, 
by means of a technological framework in which controversies, disputes, conflicts and 
litigation may be managed (and sometimes solved) online, or in a mixed combination 
of economic, social or political organizations and institutions [3, 13]. It is important to 
keep in mind that these scenarios of relational justice do not belong exclusively to a 
virtual reality, but rather to the interface between the Web and the real world. 
Therefore, they may be used in several ways, and systems and platforms may contain 
a set of tools to be used only in a single phase of the conflict or in some steps of the 
process. 
 
6 Conclusions and Further Work 
I have briefly examined in this paper the rational grounds for the two strategies for 
ODR being followed in the context of the Catalan White Book on Mediation.  Several 
historical threads have been followed to understand the roots of the revival of 
argumentation theories. I have argued that history has to be taken in a whole, 
explaining the contexts in which models of state and legal methodology emerged. 
    I have showed how dialectical and rhetorical traditions may be assembled to 
produce a technological outcome. 
   Rationality is another issue. Normative approaches can be tempered with a vision of 
rationality taking into account the expressivity and creative heuristics of the 
stakeholders [69]. It is worth to point out that at the present level of Web 2.0 and 3.0 
developments, rationality is affected by the integration of data. This will have an 
impact on the original models of dialectic, rhetoric and argumentation. 
E.g., scalability affects reasoning: “[…] because the Semantic Web combines 
heterogeneity, variable data quality, and scale, the applications we envision will 
exhibit intelligent behavior owing less to an ability to carry out complex inferencing 
than an ability to exploit the large amounts of available data. That is, as we move 
from classic KBSs to Semantic Web applications, intelligence becomes a side effect 
of scale, rather than of sophisticated logical reasoning. An important corollary here is 
that, as logical reasoning becomes less important and scale and data integration 
becomes key issues, other types of reasoning —based on machine learning, linguistic, 
or statistical techniques— become crucial, especially and because they frequently 
need to integrate and use other, non-semantic data” [11]. 
These conditions concerning the Web environments have to be integrated in the 
design of platforms and tools. 
Finally, in the next future, use cases and cognitive walkthroughs will be developed, 
measured and tested in some relational justice scenarios.  
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